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Sommario
In many cases the Nash equilibria are not predictive of the ex-
perimental players’ behaviour. For some games of Game Theory it
is proposed here a method to estimate the probabilities with which
the different options will be actually chosen by balanced players, i.e.
players that are neither too competitive, nor too cooperative. This
will allow to measure the intrinsec cooperativeness degree of a game,
only in function of its payoffs. The method is shaped on the Priso-
ner’s Dilemma, then generalized for asymmetric tables, N players and
N options. It is adapted to other conditions like Chicken Game, Battle
of the Sexes, Stag Hunt and Translators (a new name proposed for a
particular condition). Then the method is applied to other games like
Diner’s Dilemma, Public Goods Game, Traveler’s Dilemma and War
of Attrition. These games are so analyzed in a probabilistic way that
is consistent to what we could expect intuitively, overcoming some
known paradoxes of the Game Theory.
En multaj kazoj la Nash ekvilibroj ne antau˘diras la eksperimentan
konduton de la ludantoj. Por iuj ludoj de Ludteorio estas proponata
cˆi-tie metodo por taksi la probablojn lau˘ kiuj la malsamaj opcioj estos
fakte elektataj far ekvilibraj ludantoj, t.e. ludantoj kiuj estas nek
tro konkuremaj, nek tro kunlaboremaj. Tio permesos ankau˘ mezuri
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la indekson de kunlaboremeco de iu ludtabelo, nur funkcie de gˆiaj
valoroj. La metodo estas studita pri la Dilemo de la Kaptitoj, poste
gˆeneraligita pri nesimetriaj tabeloj, N ludantoj kaj N opcioj. Estas
adaptita al aliaj kondicˆoj kiel la Ludo de la Kokido, la Batalo de la
Seksoj, la Cˆaso de la Cervo kaj la Tradukantoj (nova nomo proponita
por iu speciala kondicˆo). Poste la metodo estas aplikita al aliaj ludoj
kiel la Dilemo de la Vespermangˆo, la Ludo de la Publikaj Ajˆoj, la
Dilemo de la Vojagˆanto kaj la Milito per Eluzigˆo. Tiel cˆi-tiuj ludoj
estas analizitaj lau˘ probableca maniero kiu estas kohera kun tio kion
oni povus atendi intuicie, preterpasante iujn konatajn paradoksojn de
Ludteorio.
1 Nash equilibria are not always predictive
In many cases the Nash equilibria are not predictive of the experimental
players’ behaviour.
For instance, “in the Public Goods Game repeatedly played, experimental
observations show that individuals do not play the predicted noncooperative
equilibria”, at least not immediately (Ahn & Janseen, 2003, Adaptation vs.
Anticipation in Public-Good Games).
“In the Traveler’s Dilemma it seems very unlikely that any two indivi-
duals, no matter how rational they are and how certain they are about each
other’s rationality, each other’s knowledge of each other’s rationality, and so
on, will play the Nash equilibrium” (Kaushik Basu, The Traveler’s Dilemma:
Paradoxes of Rationality in Game Theory; American Economic Review, Vol.
84, No. 2, pages 391-395; May 1994).
This paradox has led some to question the value of game theory in ge-
neral, while others have suggested that a new kind of reasoning is required
to understand how it can be quite rational ultimately to make non-rational
choices. In this sense, Douglas Hofstadter proposed the theory of Superra-
tionality: “it is assumed that the answer to a symmetric problem will be the
same for all the superrational players. The strategy is found by maximizing
the payoff to each player, assuming that they all use the same strategy. In the
Prisoner’s Dilemma two superrational players, each knowing that the other
is also a superrational player, will cooperate” (Wikipedia, ref. Douglas R.
Hofstadter, 1985, Metamagical Themas, Basic Books).
I will try to quantify this concept, trying to associate to each option a
probability that estimates how many balanced players will actually choose
that option. A balanced player is a player that is neither too competitive,
nor too cooperative; in paragraph 6 we will define it more precisely. This
will allow to measure the intrinsec cooperativeness degree of a game, only in
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function of its payoffs. Only the competitive games and not the cooperative
ones will be analyzed.
This study was actually born from a practical need, i.e. preparing some
balanced bimatrixes (more simply we will call them “tables”) for a game of
mathematics and diplomacy, based on the Prisoner’s Dilemma. We will talk
about it after presenting the proposed model.
2 Prisoner’s Dilemma, other games and Hof-
stadter’s Superrationality
The Prisoner’s Dilemma was originally framed by Merrill Flood and Melvin
Dresher working at RAND Corporation in 1950. Albert W. Tucker formalized
the game with prison sentence payoffs and gave it the prisoner’s dilemma
name (Poundstone, 1992). A classic example of the prisoner’s dilemma is
presented as follows.
Two suspects are arrested by the police. The police have insufficient
evidence for a conviction, and, having separated the prisoners, visit each
of them to offer the same deal. If one testifies for the prosecution against
the other (defects) and the other remains silent (cooperates), the defector
goes free and the silent accomplice receives the full 10-year sentence. If both
remain silent, both prisoners are sentenced to only six months in jail for a
minor charge. If each betrays the other, each receives a five-year sentence.
Each prisoner must choose to betray the other or to remain silent and each
one is assured that the other would not know about the betrayal before the
end of the investigation. Both care much more about their personal freedom
than about the welfare of their accomplice. (Source: Wikipedia).
We will consider a table of Prisoner’s Dilemma, where instead of jail
years to minimize there are money prizes to maximize; given a, b, c, d ∈ R,
we define the table (a, b, c, d) in the following way: if both players cooperate,
both receive b; if both defect, both receive c; if one defects and the other
cooperates, the first receives a and the second d. Often these values are
indicated with T,R, P, S, but in this document we prefer to call them a, b, c, d
for several reasons, among them the fact that we will deal with another p
indicating a probability.
In the rest of the document we will analyze several conditions, sometimes
they are studied in the literature as a specific game, with a specific name:
1.1) a > b > c, d
In the Prisoner’s Dilemma c > d:
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1.2) a > b > c > d
while in the Chicken Game b > d ≥ c :
1.3) a > b > d ≥ c
In the Battle of the Sexes:
1.4) a > d > c ≥ b
In the Stag Hunt:
1.5) b > a > c > d
We will also study an anomalous case, that we will call the Translators
(see later):
1.6) a > c ≥ b > d
We will start from the following remark: in a table (a, b, c, d) like (100,
51, 50, 0) b − c is so small compared with a − b and c − d that each player
will probably defect, according to the Nash equilibrium. Instead, in a table
like (101, 100, 1, 0), like that one analyzed by Hofstadter for his Theory of
Superrationality, the advantages of defection a−b and c−d are so small that
is almost not worth the risk to come out with (1, 1) instead (100, 100), and
so each player will tend more to cooperation than to defection.
Now, we will analyze the following situation. We have a large number of
rational and balanced players that are going to play one time the Prisoner’s
Dilemma; they are divided in pairs and every pair plays with the same table
(a, b, c, d); we will try to find a probability p that could estimate how many
players will cooperate, consistently with the previous considerations. We set
q = 1 − p, as the defection probability. So ∀a, b, c, d ∈ R respecting the
condition 1.2) we would like to find a 0 < p < 1, reaching p = 0 only in the
limit case b ≤ c, and p = 1 only in the limit case: a ≤ b and c ≤ d. This
estimation should depend only on the given parameters (a, b, c, d), and not
on the history of the game, that’s why we are not going to consider iterated
games, Fictitious Play or Evolutionary Stable Strategies.
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3 Maximin criterion
We could try a first way applying the maximin criterion, and analyzing the
corresponding mixed strategy; we obtain: bp + dq = ap + cq, and then:
2.1) p =
c− d
(c− d)− (a− b)
But this p under the condition 1.2) is not in [0, 1], so in this case the 2.1)
does not solve the problem seen in par. 2. In order to have 0 < p < 1 we
must have either:
a− b < c− d, c > d and a < b, and it happens for example in The Stag
Hunt (b > a > c > d); or:
a−b > c−d, c < d and a > b, and it happens for example in The Chicken
Game (a > b > d ≥ c).
Moreover, as we will see later, the 2.1) does not describe well these situa-
tions. For example, in the Stag Hunt, for b → ∞ we find that p → 0, but
it should tend to 1. And in the Chicken, for c− d = 0 we find p = 0, but if
a− b << b− c, defecting does not make sense.
4 Maximization of expected payoff
We can try a second way: we can study the p that maximizes the expected
payoff µ(p) = p2b + (1 − p)2c + p(1 − p)(a + d); we want 0 < p < 1, and we
have µ(0) = c and µ(1) = b. Putting dµ
dp
= 0, we obtain
2.2) p =
a+ d− 2c
2(a− b− c+ d)
= η
µ(η) is a maximum if c − d < a − b, otherwise it is a minimum. If it
is a maximum, then pMAX (the maximizing p) equals to η and we can see
that b > c ⇒ η > 1/2. In order to have η < 1 we find a − b > b − d. So,
if a − b > b − d ⇒ 1/2 < η < 1 ⇒ pMAX = η and µ(pMAX) > b; in the
other cases pMAX = 1 and µ(pMAX) = b. Also in this second way, under the
condition 1.2) the p in 2.2) is not always in [0, 1].
5
5 Maximization of expected payoff, given the
opponent cooperation probability
A third way could be to try to maximize the payoff µ1 of player 1, given the
p2, the cooperation probability of player 2.
µ1 = p1p2b+ (1− p1)(1− p2)c+ p1(1− p2)d+ p2(1− p1)a
µ1(p1) is a linear function with domain 0 ≤ p1 ≤ 1, having maximum in
p1 = 0 if the p1 coefficient p2(b + c − a− d) + (d − c) < 0 and maximum in
p1 = 1 if p2(b+ c− a− d) + (d− c) > 0.
If p2(b+ c− a− d) + (d− c) = 0 we have p2 =
c−d
(c−d)−(a−b)
= θ and in this
case the function is flat.
Studying the function µ1(p1) it is possible to see that p1MAX = 1 only if
θ ∈ [0, 1)(⇔ c ≤ d) and p2 < θ, otherwise p1MAX = 0. This is consistent with
the Nash equilibria (p1MAX = 0) in the Prisoner’s Dilemma (a > b > c > d)
and also with the non-coordination Nash equilibria in the Chicken Game
(a > b > d ≥ c). In the Chicken Game, assuming that we know p2, we can
switch our p1 from 0 to 1 if we see that p2 < θ, and vicecersa. If p2 = θ then
our p1 does not affect µ1.
But still we did not find what we are looking for, because this third
approach does not solve the problem seen in par. 2.
6 The proposed estimation of the coopera-
tion probability
Let us examine a fourth way. Under the condition 1.2) (a > b > c >
d), we try to think the possible behaviour of a player X playing against a
player Y. We can assume that the probability px that s/he will cooperate
is proportional to b − c (the benefit received by two cooperating players
compared with two defecting players), while the probability qx that s/he will
defect is proportional to py(a− b)+ qy(c− d) (the benefits received by player
X defecting instead of cooperating, weighted according to the cooperation
and defection probabilities of player Y). We define such a player as balanced
, meaning that this behaviour weights equally the competition benefit and
the cooperation benefit, so we can say that such a player is neither too
competitive, nor too cooperative.
We could start our reasoning giving to py an arbitrary initial value 0 ≤
p0 ≤ 1 (q0 = 1 − p0). Said b − c = φ and p0(a − b) + q0(c − d) = χ0, the
first estimation of px is p1 = φ/(φ+ χ0). Now, using this first estimation of
px, we can try to give a first estimation of py, considering that, consistently
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with the previous reasoning, py is proportional to φ and qy is proportional to
p1(a−b)+q1(c−d) = χ1, so p2 = φ/(φ+χ1). We can continue this procedure
giving a second estimation of px, then a second estimation of py, and so on.
Said p(a− b) + q(c− d) = χ, this recursive sequence pi, independently from
the starting point p0, will tend to: p = φ/(φ+ χ).
From there we obtain a second degree equation:
3) p2(a− b− c+ d) + p(b− d) + (c− b) = 0
with solution
4.1) p =
d− b±
√
(b− d)2 + 4(b− c)(a− b− c + d)
2(a− b− c+ d)
with a− b− c+ d 6= 0.
If a− b− c + d = 0 from the 3) we have more simply
4.2) p =
b− c
a− c
For example, going back to what we have seen in paragraph 2, in the Hof-
stadter’s table (101, 100, 1, 0) the 4.2) gives p = 99%, and in the table (100,
51, 50, 0) the 4.1) gives p ≈ 1.96%; these results are consistent with what we
could expect intuitively. Hence, we can measure the intrinsec cooperative-
ness degree of a table, only in function of its payoffs. Moreover, given a table
and its estimated p∗, we can say that a group of players played quite coope-
ratively (or competitively), if their cooperation rate was greater (or smaller)
than p∗. Or, if a certain player played several times this same table against
different players (without knowing their history), we can say that this player
played quite cooperatively (or competitively) if his/her cooperation rate was
greater (or smaller) than p∗.
7 The probability is univocal and always de-
fined
We can prove that under condition 1.2) (a > b > c > d) there is always only
one root of the equation 4.1) in [0, 1], so in Prisoner’s Dilemma the proposed
estimation is univocal and always defined.
We call t and v the roots of the equation. Then:
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b−d
a−b−c+d
= −(t + v) and c−b
a−b−c+d
= tv
Given a table (a, b, c, d), all other tables obtained from the first maintaing
unchanged the differences a − b, b − c, c − d are equivalent concerning the
calculation of p. Therefore we can fix d = 0 and then express a and c as a
function of b, t, v.
We obtain a
b
= 2− tv+1
t+v
and c
b
= 1− tv
t+v
, with t+ v 6= 0.
From the condition 1.2, and being d = 0⇒ b > 0, we have:
a
b
> 1⇒ 2− tv+1
t+v
> 1⇒ tv+1
t+v
< 1.
If t + v > 0⇒ t + v > tv + 1.
If t + v < 0⇒ t + v < tv + 1
and moreover:
c
b
< 1⇒ 1− tv
t+v
< 1⇒ tv
t+v
> 0.
If t + v > 0⇒ tv > 0
If t + v < 0⇒ tv < 0
We first analyze the hypothesis t+ v > 0:
t+ v > 0⇒ tv > 0⇒ t, v > 0.
The roots cannot be both greater than 1. If they were, we would have:
t = 1+x, v = 1+y, with x, y real positive. t+v > tv+1⇒ (1+x)+(1+y) >
(1 + x)(1 + y) + 1⇒ 2 + x+ y > 1 + x+ y + xy + 1⇒ xy < 0, impossible.
At the same time the roots cannot be both in [0, 1]:
t+ v > tv + 1⇒ t(1− v) > 1− v ⇒
if 1− v > 0(⇒ v < 1)⇒ t > 1−v
1−v
= 1
if 1− v < 0(⇒ v > 1)⇒ t < 1−v
1−v
= 1
Hence, in the hypothesis t + v > 0, there is always one root in [0, 1] and
the other one greater than 1.
We analyze now the other hypothesis t+ v < 0:
t+v < 0⇒ tv < 0 so the roots have opposite signs. Said t < 0 and v > 0,
we have: t + v < tv + 1 ⇒ v(t − 1) > t − 1 ⇒ v < 1. Therefore in the hy-
pothesis t+v < 0 there is always one root in [0, 1] and the other one negative.
Furthermore, it is easy to prove that in the 4.1) the root in [0, 1] is always
that one with +
√
(b− d)2 + 4(b− c)(a− b− c+ d), so:
4.3) p =
d− b+
√
(b− d)2 + 4(b− c)(a− b− c+ d)
2(a− b− c+ d)
8
8 Equiprobability condition
In the light of what we said, in some tables it will be more probable that
players cooperate and in other it will be more probable that players defect.
We search now under which condition is the boundary between these two
types of tables. So we impose p = 1/2, therefore
5) p =
d− b+
√
(b− d)2 + 4(b− c)(a− b− c+ d)
2(a− b− c+ d)
=
1
2
We obtain the equiprobability condition:
6) a− d = 3(b− c) ⇔ b− c =
(a− b) + (c− d)
2
so b − c is the average of a − b and c − d, as it could be easily deduced
also from the initial model, putting p = q (and so φ = χ). It is possible to
prove that, as expected, p > 1/2⇔ b− c > (a−b)+(c−d)
2
.
9 Prisoner’s Dilemma with n players
In the case with 3 players, we define the table as follows: if everyone coo-
perates, everyone receives g; if one defects and two cooperate, the first one
receives f , and the other two receive j; if two defect and one cooperate, the
first two receive h and the third one receives m; if everyone defects, everyone
receives k:
C,C,C → g, g, g; D,C,C → f, j, j; D,D,C → h, h,m; D,D,D → k, k, k;
with f, g, h, j, k,m ∈ R.
Supposing that one player will cooperate, the table for the other two
players becomes: (f, g, h, j); studying this table under the condition 1.2) we
need f > g > h > j. Supposing that one player will defect, the table for
the other two players becomes: (h, j, k,m); studying this table under the
condition 1.2) we need h > j > k > m. Therefore, the condition 1.2) for 3
players becomes f > g > h > j > k > m.
7) f > g > h > j > k > m
Now we will analyze the cooperation probability p and the defection pro-
bability q consistently to the model for 2 players. Supposing that one player
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will cooperate, in the table (f, g, h, j) p is proportional to g − h = φp and
q is proportional to p(f − g) + q(h − j) = χp; supposing that one player
will defect, in the table (h, j, k,m) p is proportional to j − k = φq and q is
proportional to p(h− j) + q(k −m) = χq.
Hence we consider p proportional to pφp+ qφq = p(g− h) + q(j − k) = ψ
and q proportional to pχp + qχq = p
2(f − g) + 2pq(h− j) + q2(k −m) = ω.
Hence p = ψ/(ψ + ω).
From there we obtain a third degree equation:
8) p3(f − g − 2h+ 2j + k −m) + p2(g + h− 3j − k + 2m)+
+ p(−g + h+ 2j − k −m) + (−j + k) = 0
Putting p = 1/2, and so ψ = ω, we obtain the equiprobability condition:
8.1) f −m+ 4(h− j) = 3(g − k)
The procedure can be recursively extended to n players, even if for n ≥ 5,
as known, only in some cases we will be able to calculate exactly the roots.
10 Prisonner’s Dilemma with asymmetric ta-
bles
We will now extend the model to asymmetric tables, analogously to para-
graph 6. We define an asymmetric table (ax, bx, cx, dx, ay, by, cy, dy) in the
following way: if both players cooperate, player X receives bx and player Y
receives by; if both defect, player X receives cx and player Y receives cy; if
player X defects and player Y cooperates, the first receives ax and the second
dy; if player X cooperates and player Y defects, the first receives dx and the
second ay.
We try to think the possible behaviour of a generical player X playing
against a generical player Y. Under the condition 1.2) (ax > bx > cx > dx
and ay > by > cy > dy), we can assume that the probability px that player X
will cooperate is proportional to bx − cx, while the probability qx that s/he
will defect is proportional to py(ax − bx) + qy(cx − dx). We could start our
reasoning giving to py an arbitrary initial value 0 ≤ py0 ≤ 1 (qy0 = 1− py0).
Said bx−cx = φx and py0(ax−bx)+qy0(cx−dx) = χx0, the first estimation
of px is px1 = φx/(φx + χx0). Now, using this first estimation of px, we can
try to give a first estimation of py, considering that, consistently with the
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previous reasoning, py is proportional to by−cy = φy and qy is proportional to
px1(ay−by)+qx1(cy−dy) = χy1, so py2 = φy/(φy+χy1). We can continue this
procedure giving a second estimation of px, then a second estimation of py,
and so on. Said py(ax−bx)+qy(cx−dx) = χx and px(ay−by)+qx(cy−dy) = χy,
this recursive sequence, independently from the starting point, will tend to
the pair (px, py): px = φx/(φx + χx), py = φy/(φy + χy).
Solving this system we obtain the following second degree equations:
9.1) p2x(bx − dx)(ay − by − cy + dy) + px(ax(by − cy)− ay(bx − cx) + bxby+
+ dxdy − cydx + cxdy − 2bxcy − 2bycx + 2bxdy) + (bx − cx)(by − dy) = 0
9.2) p2y(by − dy)(ax − bx − cx + dx) + py(ay(bx − cx)− ax(by − cy) + bybx+
+ dydx − cxdy + cydx − 2bycx − 2bxcy + 2bydx) + (by − cy)(bx − dx) = 0
11 Translators condition
We come back to the case for 2 players. We analyze some other conditions
that we will find later in some applications and that are useful to define some
boundaries of the proposed estimation.
We will examine first the condition 1.6) a > c ≥ b > d. We can model
this situation in the following way. There are two translators that have an
excellent level in Esperanto, Galician and Sardinian; the first one has to
translate a text from Esperanto into Galician and the second the same text
from Esperanto into Sardinian, but the first is much faster in Galician and
the second in Sardinian (same speeds, but swapped). Collaborating means
helping the other to translate a certain paragraph of the text. So of course if
one is helped by the other he will finish earlier, and with a same excellent level
of the translated text; but if they both collaborate, they will need globally
more time than if they don’t. So saying that a, b, c, d represent the free time
remaining after work in the different cases, we obtain the 1.6).
When the condition 1.2) is not respected, the equations 4.3) and 4.2) give
often results not in [0,1]. This happens because, even when φ and χ remain
positive, some addends are negative. But consistently with the proportional
method that we are using, each addend in φ and χ must be positive. In
condition 1.6), being b − c < 0 we need to tune our method considering:
φ = 0 and χ = c− b+ p(a− b) + q(c− d), therefore p = 0, as we could have
expected.
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12 Stag Hunt condition
An interesting case is the condition 1.5) b > a ≥ c > d, called Stag Hunt. In
“Discours sur l’origine de l’ine´galite´ parmi les Hommes” (1754) Jean-Jacques
Rousseau described a situation in which two individuals go out on a hunt:
“Voila` comment les hommes purent insensiblement acque´rir quelques ide´es
grossie`res des engagements mutuels, et de l’avantage de les remplir mais
seulement autant que pouvait l’exiger l’inte´reˆt pre´sent et sensible ; car la
pre´voyance n’e´tait rien pour eux, et, loin de s’occuper d’un avenir e´loigne´,
ils ne songeaient meˆme pas au lendemain. S’agissait-il de prendre un cerf,
chacun sentait bien qu’il devait pour cela garder fide`lement son poste ; mais
si un lie`vre venait a` passer a` la porte´e de l’un d’eux, il ne faut pas douter
qu’il le poursuivit sans scrupule, et qu’ayant atteint sa proie il ne se soucia
fort peu de faire manquer la leur a` ses compagnons”. So, if both collaborate
in hunting the stag, they both receive b, if both will hunt the less worthy hare
both receive c (c < b), if one hunts the hare while the other remains alone
trying to hunt the stag, the first one receives a (b > a ≥ c) and the second
one receives d (d < c). Here we have φ = b− c + p(b− a) and χ = q(c− d).
We could expect that under this condition should be always p = 1. The
equation in this case can be expressed as:
10.1) (p− 1)(p−
c− b
−a + b− c + d
) = 0
with −a+ b− c+ d 6= 0, therefore actually one root is always 1.
Say the second root r2 = (c− b)/(−a+ b− c+ d). If r2 ≥ 1 the attractor
of the recursive sequence for the set [0, 1] is 1, and so p = 1. If 0 ≤ r2 < 1
we find
10.2) 0 ≤
b− c
a− d
< 1/2
In this case r2 is the attractor for the set [0, 1], and so p = r2. This result
could be unexpected, as a < b, but actually it is consistent with the problem:
for example, in the condition a− d >> b− c (that respects the 10.2) the risk
to receive d is not comparable to the small advantage b− a, so p is small. If
a − b + c − d = 0, we find χ = q(b − a) ⇒ p = b−c
b−c
= 1, and it agrees with
10.2), being b−c
a−d
= 1⇒ r2 ≥ 1.
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13 Chicken condition
In the Chicken Game two drivers run one against the other. If one swerves,
he will be considered as a “chicken” and the other will win the game. If
nobody swerves, they will have a serious crash, and it will be even worse
than being considered a chicken. If both swerve, they will share the shame
(having a better outcome than being the only chicken). In this game the
condition is 1.3) a > b > d ≥ c; being c− d ≤ 0 we have φ = b− c+ q(d− c)
and χ = p(a− b), therefore:
10.3) p =
3c− b− 2d±
√
(3c− b− 2d)2 − 4(2c− b− d)(a− b+ c− d)
2(a− b+ c− d)
with a− b+ c− d 6= 0.
If a− b+ c− d = 0:
10.4) p =
a− c
2a− b− c
14 Battle of the Sexes condition
A husband and a wife agree to meet this evening, but cannot recall if they
will be attending the opera or a boxing match. He prefers the boxing match
and she prefers the opera, though both prefer being together to being apart.
Let us consider the cooperation probability p as the probability to choose
the event preferred by the other. In this game the condition is the 1.4)
(a > d > c ≥ b). Therefore φ = q(d − c) and χ = c − b + p(a − b) and we
obtain:
10.5) p =
c+ b− 2d±
√
(c+ b− 2d)2 + 4(d− c)(a− b+ c− d)
2(a− b+ c− d)
with a− b+ c− d 6= 0.
If a− b+ c− d = 0 (and so a− b = d− c), we have φ = q(a− b) and then
more simply
10.6) p =
a− b
a+ d− 2b
We examine here the case (3, 0, 0, 2).
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As already seen in equation 2.1, the classical maximin mixed strategy
gives pmm =
a−c
(a−b)−(c−d)
, in this case pmm = 60%, so each player attends their
preferred event less often than the other event. Applying the 10.5) we find
p ≈ 45%, so each player attends their preferred event more often than the
other event.
15 Application to a game based on the Pri-
soner’s Dilemma
In this game there are 4 to 10 teams (with 1 or more players) representing
some nations. At each round the nations are coupled and play a series of
phases with tables of Prisoner’s Dilemma (or Chicken), accumulating money
that they will be able to invest in weapons or (at the end of the round)
in development points. The following parts of the round are dedicated to
alliances, spying and wars; the war winners steal money from the losers. After
a certain number of rounds, the winner is the nation with most development
points. If the number of teams is odd, at each round there will be a group
of 3 nations that will play tables for 3 players. Hence it was necessary to
have in each phase a table for 2 players and a table for 3 players, and in each
phase these 2 tables should be equilibrated between them in terms of p and µ
(average payoff in the table, weighted in terms of p). Moreover, having several
tables in each round, it was necessary that these tables were equilibrated
among them. The tables were tuned applying the formulas presented in this
study; testing the game, the obtained results were very satisfying. Here we
show some of these tables.
In the case for 2 players:
11.1) µ = p2b+ q2c+ pq(a+ d)
In the case for 3 players:
11.2) µ = p3g + q3k + p2q(f + 2j) + pq2(2h+m)
Table 1 : Management of industry and commerce
Example of two companies that don’t have the right to agree on a common
commercial strategy and that wonder if they should (D) or not (C) lower the
prices to conquer parts of the market from their opponent.
1) D,D = 5,5
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2) C,C = 7,7
3) D,C = 10,1
(p=35 %, µ =5,47)
For 3 players :
1) D,D,D = 4,4,4
2) C,C,C = 8,8,8
3) D,D,C = 7,7,2
4) D,C,C = 10,5,5
(p=33%, µ =5,33)
Table 2 : Corruption
Every country did small or big illegal actions... Are you going (D) or not
(C) to denounce your opponent ?
1) D,D = -2,-2
2) C,C = 2,2
3) D,C = 8,-4
(p=50%, µ =1)
For 3 players :
1) D,D,D = -2,-2,-2
2) C,C,C = 4,4,4
3) D,D,C = 1,1,-4
4) D,C,C = 10,-2,-2
(p=50%, µ =1,25)
Table 5 : Sharing of subventions
The international funds finance the nations with sums that can be shared
more (C) or less (D) honestly.
1) D,D = 5,5
2) C,C = 8,8
3) D,C = 9,2
(p=63%, µ =6,43)
For 3 players :
1) D,D,D = 3,3,3
2) C,C,C = 8,8,8
3) D,D,C = 7,7,2
4) D,C,C = 9,6,6
(p=63%, µ =6,63)
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16 Application to the Diner’s Dilemma
In the Diner’s Dilemma N friends go to a restaurant and before to order they
decide to divide the bill in equal parts. It is possible to choose between an
expensive menu and a cheap menu. We define r the cost of the expensive
menu, s the value of the expensive menu, u the value of the cheap menu,
w the cost of the cheap menu, with r, s, u, w ∈ R+ and with the condition
r > s > u > w. If instead of menus, we consider objects, the value can
be better understood quantifying it as the price at which the object can be
resold. Moreover, we consider the condition:
12) s− r/N > u− w/N ⇔
r − w
s− u
< N
i.e. egoistically it is convenient to order the expensive menu. (r−w)/(s−
u) is the ratio between the difference of the costs and the difference of the
values, that we will call for short as costs-benefits ratio (Rcb).
Remodeling the problem as in the case of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, in the
case N = 2 we will have:
a = s− r/2− w/2
b = u− w
c = s− r
d = u− r/2− w/2
Considering the condition 1.2) for the Prisoner’s Dilemma we find
13) a > b ⇔ Rcb < 2
that is equivalent to 12) for N = 2, and
14) b > c ⇔ Rcb > 1
From c > d we obtain again the 13). From the equiprobability condition
6) we find:
15) p > 1/2 ⇔ a− d < 3(b− c) ⇔ Rcb >
4
3
Being a− b = c− d, from 4.2) we obtain p as a function of Rcb:
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16) p =
b− c
a− c
⇔ p = 2− 2/Rcb
with domain defined by 1 < Rcb < 2. In the limit case Rcb = 2 we find
p = 1, and indeed a = b e c = d, so there is no convenience in defecting. In
the other limit case Rcb = 1 we find p = 0, and indeed b = c, so there is no
convenience in cooperating.
In the case N = 3 we have:
f = s− r/3− 2w/3
g = u− w
h = s− 2r/3− w/3
j = u− r/3− 2w/3
k = s− r
m = u− 2r/3− w/3
Considering the condition 7) for the Prisoner’s Dilemma with 3 players,
we find:
17) (f > g OR h > j OR k > m) ⇔ Rcb < 3
that is equivalent to 12) for N=3.
18) (g > h OR j > k) ⇔ Rcb > 3/2
From the equiprobability condition 9) we have:
19) p > 1/2 ⇔ 3(g − k) > f −m+ 4(h− j) ⇔ Rcb > 2
From equation 8), being equal to 0 the coefficients of p3 e p2, we obtain
an equation of first degree that expresses p as a function of Rcb:
20) p =
k − j
−g + h+ 2j − k −m
⇔ p = 2− 3/Rcb
with the domain defined from 1.5 < Rcb < 3.
Can we suppose that for N players the formula is p = 2 − N/Rcb with
domain N/2 < Rcb < N ?
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17 Application to the Public Goods Game
We find a very similar result in the Public Goods Game. In the basic game
each player has r Euros (r ∈ R) and decides how much s/he wants to put in
a common pot. Then the euros in the pot grow by an interest rate of k > 1
(k ∈ R), and then they are equally redistributed to the players. We will
analyze the simple case of 2 players, where each player can put either r or 0.
We find:
a = r + kr/2
b = kr
c = r
d = kr/2.
a > b⇒ k < 2
b > c⇒ k > 1.
a− b = c− d⇒ p = b−c
a−c
= 2− 2/k.
p > 1/2⇒ k > 4/3.
Exactly as in the 13-16 of Diner’s Dilemma.
Now we can try to see what happens if each player has not only 2 op-
tions, but N + 1 options (N ∈ N), having the possibility to put in the pot:
0, r/N, 2r/N, ..., ir/N, ..., r. Said ir/N and jr/N two possible amounts to
put in the pot (i, j ∈ N), said Tij the table considering the two options i
or j, we define pij as the cooperation probability in Tij , meaning the pro-
bability to put the larger amount between ir/N and jr/N . And we define
qij = 1 − pij . As p = 2 − 2/k, p depends only on k, and not on r,i or
j; fixed k∗, we define the value 2 − 2/k∗ = p∗, and q∗ = 1 − p∗. We de-
fine pi = p(ir/N) the probability to choose the amount ir/N among the
N + 1 options. In analogy with the paragraph 6, each pi is proportional to
Ui =
∑i−1
j=0 pij +
∑N
j=i+1 qij = ip∗ + (N − i)q∗.
So, for each i we calculate the proportionality coefficient Ui adding the
probabilities to play the amount ir/N in the table Tij for each other j. In
fact, for j < i, in the table Tij, the probability to play the amount ir/N is
p∗, and for j > i is q∗. We find that
∑N
i=0 Ui = N(N + 1)/2 = W . Then the
pi are:
21) pi =
Ui
W
=
ip∗ + (N − i)q∗
N(N + 1)/2
For a numerical example, let us set r = 100, N = 4 and so we have 5
options: 0, 25, 50, 75 or 100 euros.
For k = 4/3 ⇒ p∗ = 1/2, we obtain: pi = 20% each, because we are in
the equiprobability condition.
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For k = 3/2⇒ p∗ = 2/3, we obtain:
p0 = p(0) = 4/30 ≈ 13.3%,
p1 = p(25) = 5/30 ≈ 16.7%,
p2 = p(50) = 6/30 = 20%,
p3 = p(75) = 7/30 ≈ 23.3% and
p4 = p(100) = 8/30 ≈ 26.7%.
The pi increase with the amount because k > 4/3.
For k = 6/5⇒ p∗ = 1/3, we obtain:
p0 = p(0) = 8/30 ≈ 26.7%,
p1 = p(25) = 7/30 ≈ 23.3%,
p2 = p(50) = 6/30 = 20%,
p3 = p(75) = 5/30 ≈ 16.7% and
p4 = p(100) = 4/30 ≈ 13.3%.
The pi decrease with the amount because k < 4/3.
18 Application to the Traveler’s Dilemma
This game was formulated in 1994 by Kaushik Basu and goes as follows. An
airline loses two suitcases belonging to two different travelers. Both suitcases
happen to be identical and contain identical antiques. An airline manager
tasked to settle the claims of both travelers explains that the airline is liable
for a maximum of $100 per suitcase, and in order to determine an honest
appraised value of the antiques the manager separates both travelers so they
can’t confer, and asks them to write down the amount of their value at no
less than $2 and no larger than $100. He also tells them that if both write
down the same number, he will treat that number as the true dollar value
of both suitcases and reimburse both travelers that amount. However, if one
writes down a smaller number than the other, this smaller number will be
taken as the true dollar value, and both travelers will receive that amount
along with a bonus/malus: $2 extra will be paid to the traveler who wrote
down the lower value and a $2 deduction will be taken from the person who
wrote down the higher amount. The challenge is: what strategy should both
travelers follow to decide the value they should write down?
Say r the maximum value, s the minimum value, t the bonus, with r > s ≥
t > 0 (r, s, t ∈ R). The two players have N +1 options: given v = (r− s)/N
they can play s, s+ v, s+ 2v, ..., s+ iv, ..., r, with i, N ∈ N.
We will try to apply again the considerations in paragraph 6 to the case
with the 2 options s + iv and s + jv (j ∈ N); said Tij the table considering
the two options i or j, we define pij as the cooperation probability in Tij ,
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so the probability to play the biggest value between s + iv and s + jv. We
obtain the following values, with i > j:
a = s+ jv + t
b = s+ iv
c = s+ jv
d = s+ jv − t.
We find a > b⇒ i− j < t/v, and t > 0⇒ c > d.
b > c⇒ i > j, already known.
Applying the 4.3, we obtain the cooperation probability pij (for i > j it
is the probability to play s+ iv):
22) pij =
−(t + (i− j)v) +
√
(t+ (i− j)v)2 − 4(i− j)2v2
2(j − i)v
If i − j ≥ t/v ⇔ b > a we are under the condition b > a > c > d, so we
must apply the 10.1).
If i < j we just swap i and j, obtaining the same cooperation probability,
that in this case will be the probability to play s + jv. We can see that pij
depends on | i− j |, but not on i or j separately.
From the equation 6, we can see that the equiprobability condition is:
23) 3(b− c) > (a− d)⇔ i− j > 2t/3v
With the same method used for the Public Goods Game, we have Ui =∑i−1
j=0 pij +
∑N
j=i+1 qij , W =
∑N
i=0 Ui and pi = Ui/W .
For a simple numerical example, let us set r = 4, s = 2, t = 2, N = 2
(3 options), v = 1. We can see that for | i − j |= 1 we have pij ≈ 38%; for
| i − j |≥ 2, considering the 10.2), we can check that (b − c)/(a− d) ≥ 1/2,
hence we have always pij = 1. We obtain:
p0 = p(2) ≈ 20.6%,
p1 = p(3) ≈ 33.3%,
p2 = p(4) ≈ 46.1%.
In the original problem, with r = 100, s = 2, t = 2, N = 98 (99 options),
v = 1; here also for | i− j |≥ 2, (b− c)/(a− d) ≥ 1/2, hence we have always
pij = 1. We obtain
p98 = p(100) ≈ 2.01%
p0 = p(2) ≈ 0.0128%
pi = p(i+ 2) ≈ i0.0206%.
These results are consistent with what we could expect intuitively.
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In the article The Traveler’s Dilemma (Basu, Kaushik. Scientific Ameri-
can Magazine; June 2007) experimental results are reported, where r = 200,
s = 80, N = 120 (121 options), v = 1. For t = 5 the average amount
proposed by the players was µ = 180, and for t = 80 it was µ = 120. Both
results are quite far from the Nash equilibrium (s = 80). With our method
we obtain: for t = 5, µ =
∑N
i=0(s + iv)pi ≈ 160 and for t = 80, µ ≈ 144.
Our model is not too far from the experimental results. We can say that for
t = 5 the players played quite cooperatively (because the average amount
180 was greater than the 160 estimated for balanced players) and for t = 80
the players played quite competitively (because the average amount 120 was
smaller than the 144 estimated for balanced players).
19 Application to the War of Attrition
The same method used for the Traveler’s Dilemma will be now applied to the
War of Attrition, with similar results. This problem was originally formulated
by John Maynard Smith in “Theory of games and the evolution of animal
contests” (1974, Journal of Theoretical Biology 47: 209-221). The game
works as follows: there are 2 players, each makes a bid; the one who bids the
highest wins a resource of value x ∈ R+. Each player pays the lowest bid. If
each player bids the same amount, they will win x/2 each.
We will analyze the case with the 2 bid options i and j (i, j ∈ N), con-
sidering pij as the cooperation probability (so the probability to play the
smallest value between i and j). We obtain for the table Tij the following
values, with i > j:
a = x− j
b = x/2 − j
c = x/2− i
d = −j.
We find a > b⇒ x > 0, already known. b > c⇒ i > j, already known.
Applying the 4.3, we obtain the cooperation probability pij (for i > j it
is the probability to play j):
24) pij =
−x/2 +
√
x2/4 + 4(i− j)2
2(i− j)
If i < j we just swap i and j, obtaining the same cooperation probability,
that in this case will be the probability to play i. We can see that pij depends
on | i − j |, but not on i or j separately. Furthermore, differently from the
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Traveler’s Dilemma, 0 < pij < 1 always. For i − j tending to +∞, p tends
to 1.
From the equation 6, we can see that the equiprobability condition is:
25) 3(b− c) > a− d⇔ i− j > x/3
With the same method used for the Public Goods Game and for the
Traveler’s Dilemma, we have Ui =
∑i−1
j=0 qij +
∑N
j=i+1 pij , W =
∑N
i=0 Ui and
pi = Ui/W .
For a simple numerical example, let us set x = 2, 0 ≤ i, j ≤ 4. We obtain:
p0 = p(0) ≈ 29.2%
p1 = p(1) ≈ 25.5%
p2 = p(2) = 20%
p3 = p(3) ≈ 14.5%
p4 = p(4) ≈ 10.8%.
Also in this case the results are consistent with what we could expect
intuitively.
20 Comparison with other experimental re-
sults
Beside the paper of (Basu, 2007), two recent papers (Darai and Gra¨tz, 2010;
Khadjavi and Lange, 2013) show results that are not far by our estimation.
In the first one a Prisoner’s Dilemma with values (J, J/2, 0, 0) is played.
“The dilemma game is played as follows: each player is assigned two balls,
one with the word steal and one with the word split inside. Then both players
choose one of the balls and open them simultaneously. If both players chose
the split ball, the jackpot (J) is divided equally between the two players.
If one player chooses steal and the other chooses split, the former gets the
whole jackpot and the latter receives nothing. If both chose steal, both get
nothing”. They observed an average cooperation rate of 54.5%, where our
method for balanced players gives 61.8%. But we must point out that there is
a pre-discussion that could increase the cooperation rate: “Before the players
have to decide which strategy to play, they get some additional time, roughly
30 seconds, to discuss with each other what they are going to do”.
In the second one, the Prisoner’s Dilemma table is (9,7,3,1), and in a first
group the cooperation rate was 37%, and in a second group 55%, where our
method for balanced players gives 66%.
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In both papers the results are far from Nash equilibria and much closer
to our estimation, and in both cases we can say that the players played more
competitively than balanced players.
21 Conclusions
The proposed approach seems to describe quite well some classical games of
the game theory, using an estimation of the behaviour of balanced players to
solve some known paradoxes of the Game Theory. This estimation can be
seen as a convenience index for the different options. Moreover, it provides a
measure of the intrinsec cooperativeness degree of a game, only in function
of its payoffs.
It is possible to apply this approach to many other games, only some
applications were showed here. Another interesting result could be to extend
this method to calculate the probability density associated to a continuous
range of options; for example, in the Public Goods Game, in the Traveler’s
Dilemma and in the War of Attrition, each player could choose whatever real
number in a fixed range.
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